politicised".
8 This is an important view: if these authors are correct about their 'democracy thesis', it means that European private law needs to be 'made' in a very different way than it is now.
In this contribution, I argue that this view -the 'democracy thesis'-is mistaken. The present Europeanisation and globalisation processes should radically change our view of how rules, either existing or new ones, in the area of private law are legitimised. My aim is not to reiterate the entire debate about the legitimacy of new modes of governance, 9 but to focus directly on rules that seek to regulate the conduct of private parties. It is thus the core of private law, and specifically the law of contract, with which I am concerned. In this area, I
argue that there are different (and better) ways of legitimising private law outside of national parliaments.
This contribution is structured as follows. Section II begins with a more general overview of new types of rule-making that, although they evade the democratic decisionmaking process, are important in regulating the behaviour of individuals and states. This raises the question of to what extent the emergence of these new types of rules pose a problem for the legitimacy of private law. I argue that the problem arises only if we perceive legitimacy in a very restrictive way, limiting it to democratic decision-making by national parliaments. Section III therefore proposes an alternative approach, a functional one, in which the concept of democracy is deconstructed into various building blocks. This more general theoretical framework should then allow us to assess the Draft CFR in more detail in section IV. Section V sums up the main argument.
II. Law without a state: A problem of democracy?
The drafting of legal rules by academics for the future application of these rules by private parties or states -as in the case of the Draft CFR-is only one example of so-called very much based on the nation-state experience, so as to meet the different conditions of global governance. 26 The importance of such a venture is paramount because, as one author puts it, "democracy will be possible beyond the nation-state -or democracy will cease to be possible at all".
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In the next section, it is attempted to deconstruct democracy into various building blocks. If we establish the functions that democracy currently fulfils, we can subsequently see whether these functions can be fulfilled in another way than through national parliaments.
III. Deconstructing democracy
The approach followed in this section is one in which the concept of democracy is deconstructed into various building blocks. If we are able to define the functions of democracy, it is possible to establish whether these functions can also be fulfilled in another way in the area of European or even global lawmaking. It is clear that finding such substitutes for the democratic legitimacy of law is only possible when we stop thinking in terms of national states or parliaments. Instead, the legitimacy of law should be found in other factors.
It is also important to realise that our concern is not with all aspects of democracy or of tasks of national parliaments: as indicated above, this paper only deals with the lawmaking process, in particular, in the area of private law. Having said this, this section first suggests that it is not democracy that is at stake when drafting law, but rather the legitimacy of the rules in question. Second, it is argued that such legitimacy can be found in three different factors.
It should first be acknowledged that it is difficult to use the term democracy for something that is not related to representative government. The present connotation of the word refers so much to parliamentary representation that it can be confusing to use it for mechanisms that are equal to democratic decision-making at other levels than the state. This is one of the reasons why Rubin suggests abandoning the term in political analyses. 28 It seems better to use the word legitimacy instead, even though this term does not have a fixed meet the three building blocks of democracy in another way. After a discussion about accountability (A) and participation (B), the section on transparency (C) reveals that the nature of private law partly stands in the way of considering it as an area subordinate to policymaking.
A. Accountability: Legitimacy through jurisdictional competition
In the brief characterisation of accountability provided above, it became clear that the core of the concept consists of a relationship between the relevant actors and a forum and that such a relationship can be established in different ways. If the rule-maker cannot be held responsible in the traditional way -by being voted away-, what could be an alternative?
Without claiming this is the only possible way of enhancing the legitimacy of trans-national rules, 45 I believe that market accountability can be much more important in legitimating law than is usually assumed. This is in particular true in those areas of law that contain many nonmandatory rules, such as the law of contract. If market accountability in, for example, schools means that good schools attract students whereas bad schools are held accountable by students that leave, a similar mechanism can operate in the fields of facilitative law.
This view is, of course, not new. The theory of jurisdictional competition, as developed by Charles Tiebout, 46 emphasises that when parties have the freedom of choice as to the applicable legal regime -as is the case in large parts of contract law-, they will choose the regime they like best. Such jurisdictional competition is an alternative to allocating local public goods in a political decision-process: the preferences of citizens can be established by allowing the citizens to choose for a particular legal regime, even without these citizens moving physically.
not used as a source of inspiration by legislators or courts, the drafters are held accountable for the lack of success of this particular legal regime.
B. Participation: The experience with optional instruments
It was seen above 53 that the legitimacy of rules does not necessarily have to be based on the participation of everyone in everything. The adherents of the 'democracy thesis' set out in section I seem to suggest the opposite: since all law is politics, changing the law requires a political decision by a parliament that should be involved in both the drafting and the adoption of the rules. This is a rather traditional view of democratic input and one that is clearly contradicted by our experience with the drafting of civil codes. Second, it should be re-emphasised that present efforts to Europeanise private lawand in particular the work on the DCFR-will not lead to rules that are binding in the same and the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG). In these two cases, the only 'democratic' input consisted of individual American state parliaments -in the case of the UCC-and of national parliaments -in the case of the CISG-adopting an already existing instrument. These experiences indicate that parliaments may not necessarily be involved in the drafting of a successful code.
C. Private law: Design or organism?
The third building block of democracy relates to the requirement of transparency. If applied to rule-making in the field of private law, it is my view that, in particular, the quality of the deliberation is important: we have seen before that informed deliberation among specialists may lead to greater legitimacy than a general debate among non-specialists. When applied to private law, what comes closest to the transparency requirement is that new statutes and case law are assessed on the basis of the already existing coherent system, which provides us with the criteria to assess to what extent the new rules fit into the existing normative order.
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At the same time, however, we should be cautious in applying the requirement of transparency to the field of private law as if this is just another policy field. design by some legislator is in line with the nature of the field. Most of the time, private law is seen as independent from state institutions, having a rationality of its own. 59 The private law system has developed over the ages in a long process of trial and error. 60 The spontaneous development towards the standards that a community prefers provides this area of law with a rationality of its own which is independent from most public aims.
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If we thus understand private law more as an organism than as a product of explicit 64 Moreover, the redistribution of welfare through (in particular) contract law is doomed to fail because future contracting parties are not likely to contract with 'weaker' parties if they would run the risk of avoidance of their contract. This is also the message of Charles Fried:
"Redistribution is not a burden to be borne in a random, ad hoc way by those who happen to cross paths with persons poorer than themselves. Such a conception, heart-warmingly spontaneous though it may be, would in the end undermine our ability to plan and to live our lives as we choose".
The above does not imply that democratic input is never useful; it does imply, however, that the degree of legitimacy is dependent on the type of law being put into place.
Facilitative law needs less legitimacy than mandatory law. Put otherwise: national democratic input is useful in the case of interventionist law, such as consumer protection and employment law, because preferences as to the level of intervention differ between countries. In facilitative law, preferences are better revealed by jurisdictional competition.
V. Conclusions
The main argument of this article is that 'democratic' legitimacy does not have to come about through territorial entities such as national parliaments. There are other methods of legitimating law; which method is best, depends on a range of factors such as the type of rules and the level of harmonisation. In the case of the Draft CFR, it is important to realise that it is at most a source of inspiration for European and national legislators and courts and an optional code to be chosen by contracting parties if they believe it serves their interests better than national law. This optional character of the DCFR must mean something for its legitimacy. It is primarily the participation of the mentioned actors that decides on the actual legitimacy of the non-binding DCFR. This does not exclude that parliaments can still play a role -for example, by ex post accepting "public acts characterised by expertise and rationality"-67 but it is different from the role they have to play in setting mandatory rules.
The approach set out in this contribution opens the possibility to investigate whether the new types of law described in section II meet the necessary requirements of legitimacy.
The mere fact that these types of law are often set at the European or global level and do not pass through national parliaments is, as such, not relevant in assessing their merits. What is relevant is to what extent they meet the requirements of participation, accountability and transparency. This differentiated approach, in which each new type of rules is assessed on the basis of these factors, was applied here to the case of the DCFR. It shows that the 'democracy thesis' cannot be accepted: new forms of private law require new forms of legitimacy.
